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Abstract 
The objective of this thesis is twofold. One is 
to reconstruct the development of Thomas Kuhn ‘ s idea of 
incoinmensurability. In his book, The Structure of 
Scientific Revolutions, incommensurability means 
standards variance, conceptual change and different world 
views of rival scientific paradigms. After that, the 
notion of incommensurability is developed into the 
categories of language and translation. Kuhn argues that 
when he talks about incommensurability between different 
scientific theories, what he means is that there is no 
common language which can be employed to expresss rival 
theories. If so, the untranslatability between different 
theories becomes the main idea of incommensurability. 
Kuhn stresses that his original idea of 
incommensurabi1ity is called “local incommensurability". 
Different scientific theories entails different taxonomic 
structures and there .are some terms which cannot be 
translated into other scientific connmunities. However, 
Kuhn points out that this local incoinmensurability does 
not entail that it is . impossible to coinmunicate between 
different scientific theories. Through language learning, 
modern scientists can understand the past scientific 
t ext s. 
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Secondly, this thesis attempts to compare 
Kuhn‘s later notion of incommensurability and Quine‘s 
indeterminacy of translation. The purpose of comparison 
is to clarify Kuhn ‘ s later i d e a s .工 want to argue that 
w h i l e Quine ‘ s idea is to stress the multiplicity of 
translation manuals while Kuhn‘s idea is to highlight the 
failure of any translation between rival theories. 
Moreover, the job of Quine‘s radical translator and that 
of Kuhn‘s historian of science are different in the sense 
that the job of Quine‘s radical translator is translation 
whereas the job of Kuhn‘s historian of science is 
interpretation. This difference reveals that rival 
theories can communicate with each other through language 
learning though rival theories are incoiranensurable. That 
means historians of science can describe the w o r l d in 
w h i c h the past scientists believed, instead of 
translating the term of past scientific text into the 
modern language. Furthermore, Quine stresses that 
indeterminacy entails inscrutability of reference; 
however, Kuhn wants to defend the determination of 
reference. 、 
The similarities between Quine‘s and Kuhn‘s are 
this： Firstly, in their critique of the traditional idea 
of meaning, Kuhn stresses "meaning in use" in language 
learning between different rival theories, and Quine‘s 
indeterminacy thesis attacks Platonic ideas of meaning 
viii 
and fixed relationship between language and object. 
Secondly, they both agree that there are no neutral and 
objective criteria in Quine‘s translation manuals as well 
as in Kuhn‘s comparison between rival theories. 
Kuhn‘s later idea of incommensurability is used 
to examine the problem of relativism. The question of 
understanding between different and rival theories is the 
main focus of relativism. It seems that Kuhn ‘ s idea of 
language learning can fruitfully employed to deal with 
the problem of relativism. Though relativism cannot be 
regarded as Kuhn‘s later position, yet Kuhn agrees that 
relativism is still right in the sense that the 
traditional idea of the relationship between language and 
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1.1 Kuhn‘s Philosophy of Science as Opposition to 
Traditional View 
Understanding the external world and internal 
mind is regarded as the intention of all human 
knowledges . The premise of the understandabi 1 ity of the 
external world provides the foundation for human being to 
investigate the laws or rules of the world. Philosophy 
and science as two main human knowledges are always 
linked to each other in order to understand the world. As 
an attempt to understand the world, philosophy and 
science come together to discover the ultimate ground and 
foundation of our world. However, their relationship is 
rather complex. Scientific achievements always attack the 
answer given by philosophy, and scientists claim that 
their empirical results can replace many philosophical 
ideas. On the other hand, scientific method and the 
nature of scientific activity are challenged by large 
amounts of philosophical examinations. 
Scientists claim that they find the laws of 
nature, discover the key to the reality and their methods 
are objective. Moreover, they provide “explanations“ for 
many natural phenomena and stress that their results are 
"facts". Those facts are supported by evidences which are 
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collected by observation. These features build up the 
image of objectivity of scientific activity and 
scientific knowledge. Howsve IT, what is the natuire of 
scientific knowledge ？ Is scientific method really 
objective ？ What is meant by “ objective “ ？ Can pure 
observation be possible ？ How do the scientists collect 
their data ？ What is the logical procedure behind the 
scientific activities ？ When the scientists note down 
their results, are their words meaningful ？ The above 
questions are asked by philosophers of science. The job 
of philosophy of science is to examine and criticize the 
foundation of natural science. 
In the following discussion, 工 will limit 
myself to Kuhn‘s philosophy of science and locate his 
contributions in the context of some foundamental 
questions in this field. 
In the history of science, scientific theories 
replace one another. Commonly speaking, the better 
theories have better models to ”explain" the 
observational data. In other words, the past scientific 
models are incapable of accounting for the facts. Those 
observational data or facts are "empirical“, which means 
they are collected by experience. However, what are the 
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reasons for the replacement of different scientific 
theories ？ In the comparison of rival theories, w e h a v e 
to assume some terms whose meanings are independent of 
their theoretical context. In other w o r d s , comparison of 
different scientific theories is possible if and only if 
there are some terms that have the same meanings in 
different t h e o r i e s O t h e r w i s e , if they are not talking 
about the same things, it is not p o s s i b l e to compare. 
However, do w e have any terms w h o s e m e a n i n g s 
are really theory- independent ？ W h e n w e report our 
scientific results or explain the collected data, are w e 
"merely observing“ or “ interpreting it in the context of 
the theory" ？ These questions are related to the question 
of distinction of theoretical terms and observational 
t e r m s . 2 Theoretical terms are, for examples, electron, 
charge, m a s s , force, atom, etc.； and observational terms 
are red, water, weight, iron, etc.. However, some 
philosophers claim that the distinction between b o t h 
terms are not clear-cut. Because it is difficult for us 
to distinguish two types of “ observations “ ？ Is it 
1 Shapere D., "Introduction", in Philosophical 
Problems of Natural Science, N . Y . : The M a c m i l l a n Company, 
1965, P.15. 
^ The background of this debate is discussed in 
Shapere D.,〇p. cit., P.1-14. A m o r e detailed explanation 
is presented in Suppe F . , "The Search for Philosophic 
Understanding of Scientific Theories" in The Structure of 
Scientific Theories, Chicago： University of Illinois 
Press, 1977, P.45-53. 
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possible for us to have so-called “ pure observation" ？ 
That means w h e n w e observe the external world, can w e 
claim that w e are not using a particular context to 
observe it ？ If not, how can w e distinguish our 
observational results and theoretical terms ？ 
- I 
Many philosophers of science stress that our 
scientific theories are "theory-laden“ and "theory-
dependent“. Suppe concludes their points of view in the 
following： 
( 1 ) “Observation is theory-laded： The 
Weltanschauung determines h o w one views 
the w o r l d . "3 
( 2 ) "Meanings are theory-dependent： The 
descriptive terms used by a science 
undergo a shift in meaning w h e n 
incorporated into a theory; thus the 
principles of a theory help determine 
the meanings of the terms occuring in 
them, and so the meanings of such terms 
will vary from theory to theory. 
3 Suppe F., o p . cit., P . 1 9 1 . . 
4 工 b i d . 
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( 3 ) "Facts are theory-laded： What counts as 
a fact is determined by the 
Weltanschauung associated with a theory; 
as such there is no neutral set of facts 
for assessing the relative adequacy of 
two competing theories； rather, the 
adequacy of a theory must be assessed 
according to standards set by its 
associated Weltanschauung. 
In sum, different theories hold different world views. 
Within a particular scientific world view, observation 
and many scientific activities are no longer theory-free. 
The meaning of scientific terms is only undertstood under 
a particular scientific theory. That means change in 
meaning will take place if a theory is replaced by 
another one. If so, it will, lead to the problem of 
comparison of different theories. Because of the change 
in meaning of scientific terms, different scientific 
theories constitute their own evaluation methods and 
develop their particular understanding of the external 
world. In other words, scientists in different scientific 
theories are actually living in different worlds. They 
use their own "glasses“ to see the world. So, this point 
5 工bid. 、 
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of view will lead to a serious question of the 
difficulity of communication and comparison of different 
scientific theories. 
Thomas Kuhn adopts, in general, the above 
points of view. In his book, The Structure of Scientific 
Revolutions, the "paradigms “ constitute the ways in which 
different scientists view the external w o r l d . In Kuhn's 
historical research of scientific development, many 
theories are replaced by other theories. A paradigm is 
replaced by other paradigms. In this replacement process, 
Kuhn stresses that different scientific paradigms are 
"incommensurable". They have their own standards' their 
scientific terms are meaningful in their own contextr, and 
they have different conceptual frameworks to view the 
w o r l d . 
However, Kuhn‘s position is in question that 
( 1 ) what is meant by "living in two different worlds“ ？ 
Does Kuhn take this phrase seriously ？ ( 2 ) If the 
reason for the replacement of different theories is only 
the “shift" of different paradigms, how can w e talk about 
the "progress” or “advance" of scientific activities ？ ( 
3 ) Kuhn claims that different theories are 
incommensurable； does it imply that it is not possible to 
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"compare" different theories ？ If so, in what sense a 
theory is "better" than the other theory ？ Under what 
criteria do the scientists choose one theory instead of 
other alternatives ？ ( 4 ) If Kuhn is right, 
coimunication of different theories is problematic. 
Different scientific paradigms hold different or rival 
world views; they employ scientific terms in different 
w a y s . How can they communicate to each other ？ However, 
in our reality, the communication between the past and 
modern scientific theories is happening. Many historians 
of science understand the meanings of past scientific 
texts and use modern scientific languages to explain 
them. How can Kuhn explain and give answer to the these 
situations ？ 
We can notice that the above questions are 
linked with the notion of "incommensurability". This 
problematic conception is the foundational idea of Kuhn‘s 
philosophy of science. What is the real meaning of 
"incommensurability" ？ 、 Does the phrase “different 
scientific paradigms are incommensurable" make sense ？ 
This thesis attempts to answer this question. 
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1.2 Purpose and Structure 
In the above section,工 have mentioned that 
this thesis is to examine Kuhn's notion of 
incommensurability. Apart from reconstructing Kuhn‘s 
early and later version of this notion, I will compare 
Kuhn's incommensurability thesis and Quine‘s 
indeterminacy of translation thesis. Through the 
comparison, we will know Kuhn‘s exact idea of this notion 
of incoiranensurability. There are two reasons to choose 
Quine‘s philosophy. Firstly, Quine‘s idea of translation 
appears and is mentioned by Kuhn throughout his texts. 
From SSR to later stages, when Kuhn talks about 
incoiranensurability, he often quotes Quine‘s ideas to 
illustrate his points. So it is interesting to see the 
difference and similarity of these two ideas. Secondly, 
when some philosophers discuss the problems of 
relativism, they always link Kuhn ‘ s and Quine ‘ s ideas 
together/ They claim that both ideas, incommensurability 
and indeterminacy of translation, represent the form of 
relativism. So, through out the comparison, we can 
6 For examples, 工 a n Hacking, “Language, Truth and 
Reason" in Hollis M . & Lukes S, ( eds )' Rationality and 
Relativism, Oxford： Blackwell, 1982, P.58-61; Also, in 
the same book, Newton-Smith • W . , "Relativism and the 
Possibility 、of Interpretation", P.116-120; Lukes S., 
“Relativism in its Place", P.273-275. 
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clarify the idea of incommensurability. In sum, there are 
two intentions in this thesis: ( 1 ) Reconstruct the 
development of Kuhn's idea of incommensurability. ( 2 ) 
Compare Kuhn•s later idea of incoiranensurability and 
Quine‘s idea of indeterminacy of translation. 
Thus, the structure of this thesis is simple.工 
will discuss the development of Kuhn ‘ s idea of 
incommensurability ( Chapter 2 ). This chapter is divided 
into three sections. Section 2.1 outlines SSR* s notion of 
incommensurability which means standards variance, 
• conceptual change and world-views difference between 
different scientific paradigms. Section 2.2 is the 
transitional period. Kuhn's orientation is shifted into 
the notion of language. Incommensurability entails 
lacking of coinmon language between rival theories and the 
question of incommensuarbi 1 i ty is the problem of 
translation. Finally, in section 2.3, Kuhn stresses the 
notion of “ local incommensurability“ and he thinks that 
incoiranensurability does not entail communication-
breakdown of different scientific theories. 
After that, the difference between Kuhn's later 
ideas of incoiranensurability and Quine ‘ s indeterminacy of 
translation is discussed ( Chapter 3 ) . Apart from the 
presentation of Quine ‘ s own idea in section 3 . 1 ,工 will 
10 
discuss the multiplicity of translation manuals and the 
failure of translation between different theories ( 
section 3 .2 ), the difference of Quine‘s radical 
translator and Kuhn‘s historian of science ( section 3.3 
) and the difference of Quine‘s inscrutability of 
reference and Kuhn‘s idea of determination of reference ( 
section 3.4 ). In summary ( section 3.5 )'工 will stress 
that the main difference of the two is the conception of 
learnability of language. 
Although there are many differences in both 
ideas, there are two similarities between them. One is 
the critique of translational idea of meaning ( section 
4.1 ). The other is the rejection of neutral and 
objective criterion ( section 4.2 )• 
In the concluding reflection,工 will use Kuhn's 
later idea of incommensurability to deal w i t h the problem 
of r e l a t i v i s m .工 will conclude that relativism is right 
in a sense that different theories and traditions do 
exist, and they holds different conceptions and ideas of 
the worlds. Translation of one tradition to another 
tradition is problematic. However, it does not entail 
that different traditions cannot communicate to each 
11 
other. This is the missing point of relativism. Language 
is obtained through learning and using. 
12 
Chapter 2 
The Development of Kuhn‘s Incommensurability Thesis 
‘ 13 
2.1 The Early Version 
In his book The Structure of Scientific 
Revolutions, Kuhn outlines the picture of history of 
w e s t e r n science. Scientific activities are divided into 
“normal science" and "revolution". Normal science is 
“research firmly based upon one or more past scientific 
a c h i e v e m e n t s . H o w e v e r , scientific revolution takes 
place when “ an older paradigm is replaced in whole or in 
part by an incompatible new o n e . S c i e n t i f i c paradigm is 
an important notion for Kuhn to account for the 
development of science. However, it seems that Kuhn does 
not define this notion in SSR clearly. Paradigm is 
- “universally recongnized scientific achievements that for 
a time provide model problems and solutions to a 
corranunity of practitioners. Moreover, he uses it in a 
broader sense that paradigms "are the source of the 
methods, problem-field, and standards of solution 
accepted by any mature scientific community at any given 
time. "4 
The main implication of his analysis of 
scientific paradigm is that different paradigms in the 
1 SSR, P.10. 
2 工 b i d . , P.92. 
3 工 b i d . , P.viii. 
4 工bid., P.103. 
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history of western science are "incommensurable". The 
problem of incommensurability is raised through the 
comparison of rival paradigms. However, Kuhn thinks that 
before we discuss the method of comparing different 
paradigms, we have to know how they are talking about the 
world differently. If different paradigms cannot 
coinmunicate with each other, it is impossible to compare 
them. When Kuhn discusses the communication problem 
between rival paradigms, we can notice that Kuhn provides 
three important reasons to account for this 
coinmunication-breakdown. These three factors are standard 
variance, conceptual change and. world-views difference. 
Kuhn views these three factors as the content of 
incommensiir ability. 
Firstly, when we want to compare two different 
systems, the first thing to do is to find out the neutral 
and objective standard which makes the comparison viable. 
However, two rival paradigms have no common standard 
because 
the proponents• of competing paradigms will 
often disagree about the list of problems 
that any candidate for paradigm must 
resolve. Their standards or their 
definitions of science are not the same.^ 
What Kuhn tries to say is that while paradigm A asserts 
that problem A' is the key problem in its understanding, 
11 Ibid., P. 150. 
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p a r a d i g m B asserts that problem B ‘ is the key problem in 
its understanding. If they cannot reach an agreement 
about their problems, it seems that their different 
solutions will only lead to a greater difficulty of 
communication. Moreover, Kuhn points out that two rival 
paradigms are not only uncommon in problems, they are 
also diverged in the serious question of standard 
v a r i a n c e . Actually, it is hopeless for the rival 
paradigms to coinmunicate with each other if they h o l d 
different criteria to analyse their scientific 
activities. 
In an essay “Objectivity, Value Judgment, and 
Theory Choice", Kuhn explains the notion of standard 
variance more clearly. Generally, w e have some criteria 
to analyse which scientific theories are m u c h "better". 
These criteria are accuracy, consistency, simplicity, 
scope, and fruitfulness / W e use these criteria to 
evaluate the adequacy of theory. However, Kuhn points out 
that the result is not so simple. The reason is that 
the criteria are、 imprecise： individuals may 
legitimately differ about their application 
to concrete cases. In addition, when deloyed 
together, they repeatedly prove to conflict 
with one other； accuracy may ... dictate the 
choice of one theory, scope the choice of 
it competitor 
6 ET, P.322. 
7 工bid., P.322. 
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In the history of science, the reason w h y theory A can 
replace theory B is not because theory A satisfies all 
these criteria. The real picture is that theory A is 
"better" than theory B under certain criteria； h o w e v e r , 
if w e use other criteria to analyse, the result m a y b e 
different ： Theory B may replace theory A . Then, what is 
the ultimate criterion ？ Kuhn asserts that there is no 
so-called ultimate criterion in a sense that scientists 
do not obtain the solutions under some fixed, unchanging 
p r o c e d u r e s . "(E)very individual choice b e t w e e n competing 
theories depends on a mixture of objective and subjective 
factors, or of shared and individual c r i t e r i a . S o , Kuhn 
calls these factors or criteria "values". Different 
scientists base on different values to choose between the 
competing theories. 
Secondly, not only are the standards and 
problems not the same in rival paradigms, Kuhn also 
points out that their vocabularies, apparatus and 
conceptual terms are different as w e l l . This conceptual 
change causes the communication-breakdown between 
p a r a d i g m s . 
Since new paradigms are born from old ones, 
they ordinarily corporate much of the 
vocabulary and apparatus, both conceptual 
and manipulative, that the traditional 
paradigm had previously employed. But they 
seldom employ these borrowed elements in 
quite the traditional way. Within the new 
11 Ibid., P. 150. 
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paradigm, old terms, concepts, and 
experiments fall into new relationships one 
with the other. The inevitable result is 
what we must call...a misunderstanding 
between the two competing schools• 
Kuhn thinks that the reason for the m i sunder s t anding 
between two rival paradigms is the change of meaning of 
concepts. The whole conceptual w e b has been shifted from 
Newtonian physics to Einstein's physics. The meanings of 
Newtonian concepts of space, time, force and mass are not 
the same in Einstein's relativity framework. Since 
different paradigms use terms differently, they, as a 
result, understand the world differently. 
So, thirdly, Kuhn argues that the most 
“fundamental"" conclusion of incoiranensurability is that 
different scientists are 
practicing in different worlds, the two 
groups of scientists see different things 
when they look from the same point in the 
same direction. Again, that is not to say 
• that they can see anything they please. Both 
are looking at the world, and what they look 
at has net changed. But in some areas they 
see different things, and they see them in 
different relations one to the other.“ 
9 工 b i d . , P.149. 
1。工 bid., P.150. 
11 Ibid., P. 150. 
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This radical implication of incommensurability suggests 
that the basic reason for the failure of coiranunication is 
the difference of "conceptual frameworks“. Although Kuhn 
does not use this phrase in the above passage, the reason 
w h y they "see" different things is not a matter of taste 
or of any perception difference. They work in the same 
w o r l d , but they can "see" different realities behind the 
same object. It is because they wear different "glasses" 
( c o n c e p t u a l frameworks ) to see the same thing. W e can 
regard the conceptual framework as w o r l d v i e w . It 
organizes our sense data in order to grasp the reality. 
So, Kuhn likes to use the example of “rabbit-
duck" or "gestalt switch" to illustrate that all 
observations are theory-laded. That means our observation 
statements actually are not neutral in a sense that they 
presuppose a paradigm." Because of the notion of 
paradigm-laded, the effort to find the neutral 
observational statement to compare different paradigms is 
futile. 
We can conclude that, in SSR, 
incoimnensur abi 1 i ty means that different paradigms hold 
different standards and definitions about their fields of 
scientific disciplines. It is not easy for them to reach 
an agreement about their scientific problems and the 
evaluation standards. Moreover, it means that they use 
工bid., P. 127. 
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the same words y e t w i t h different meanings. Actually, the 
same words no longer have the same references. The change 
of m e a n i n g implies that they “see" the w o r l d differently. 
Furthermore, the scientists observe the same w o r l d in 
different perspectives because paradigms affect the 
scientists in adopting certain frameworks to understand 
the w o r l d . Because of the above reasons, 
incommensurability causes the difficulty of communication 
b e t w e e n different paradigms. If Kuhn is right, there is 
no reason for us to say that paradigm A is "better" than 
p a r a d i g m B . The world described by certain paradigms are 
relative to their inner criteria and standards. That 
means paradigm A and paradigm B use different “languages“ 
to describe the w o r l d . No one is independent and free、 
from certain paradigms. Between paradigms, no real 
communication nor any neutral standards for evaluation 
are possible. 
2.2 The Transitional Period 
In this section,工 reconstruct Kuhn‘s position 
about the notion of incommensurability after SSR and 
before his later revision. After the publication of SSR, 
the content of this notion is developed into two m a i n 
categories which are the lacking of neutral or common 
language and the problem of translation. 
20 
After SSR, Kuhn emphasizes that 
incoiranensurability does not imply " incomparability" He 
points out that many readers misunderstand his notion of 
incommensurability as incomparability. When w e say that, 
according to Kuhn, two paradigms are incommensurable, it 
does not mean that they cannot be compared. 
Most readers of my text have supposed that 
when 工 spoke of theories as 
incommensurable, I meant: that they could not 
be compared. But ‘incommensurability ‘ is a 
term borrowed from mathematics, and it 
there has no such implication. The 
hypotenuse of an isosceles right angle is 
incommensurable with its side, but the two 
can be compared to any required degree of 
precision. What is lacking is not 
comparability but a unit of length in terms 
of which both can be measured directly and 
exactly. In applying the term 
‘incommensurability , to theories, 工 had 
intended only to insist that there was no 
common language within which both could be 
fully expressed and which could therefore be 
used in a point-by-point comparison between 
them. 14 
In the above•passage, Kuhn emphasizes that the original ( 
mathematical ) meaning of incommensurability is the 
lacking of common measure. If w e want to have a "point-
by-point “compar i s o n of theories, a common language is 
required." However, Kuhn points out that no such common 
13 TCSC, P. 191; MS, P.416. 
14 TCSC, P.190-91. 
15 RC, P.266 . 
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or neutral" language is possible. Paradigm A describes 
reality A ' ； paradigm B describes reality B‘ . According to 
Kuhn, it is not possible for us to find another p a r a d i g m 
C w h i c h can describe A ' and B' fully and exactly. S o ,工 
think Kuhn's notion of common language is a kind of 
language which can describe the other realities, but it 
itself is independent from the paradigms A and B . 
The impossibility of obtaining this kind of 
common language is related to the difficulty of 
translation. If w e want to compare two successive 
theories ( point-by-point ), w e , at least, have to 
translate the empirical consequences of both theories to 
each other without loss and change. ” However, this 
neutral language cannot be obtained. The reason is that 
in the transition from one theory to the 
next words change their meanings or 
conditions of applicability in subtle ways. 
Though most of the same signs are used 
before and after a revolution e.g. 
force, mass, element, compound, cell the 
ways in which some of them attach to nature 
has somehow changed .“ 
In order to find a coirmon language to translate the 
important concepts from one paradigm to the other, the 
meanings of the key concepts must be obtained. However, 
In M S , Kuhn uses 丨丨 neutral language 丨丨 to replace 
common language.工 think both terms are interchangable. 
” R C , P.266. 
18 工 bid.、，P.266-67. 
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the untranslatability of one paradigm to another is 
caused by the change of relationship between the signs 
{ languages ) and the signified ( nature ) . Although the 
signs are the same, they attach to nature differently. It 
is difficult to translate these signs from one theory to 
another. So, we can see that Kuhn develops his notion of 
changing meaning, in SSR, to the problem of translation. 
In the postscript of SSR, Kuhn understands 
different paradigms as different language communities and 
their members are working as translators in order to 
translate their vocabularies to cornmunicate w i t h the 
other p a r a d i g m s H o w e v e r , Kuhn thinks that it is 
difficult to have a translation between different 
paradigms because the translators 
must find the best available compromise between 
incompatible objectives. Nuances must be preserved but 
not at the price of sentences so long that 
communication breaks down. Literalness is desirable but 
not if it demands introducing too many foreign words 
which must be separately discussed in a glossary or 
appendix. People deeply committed both to accuracy and 
to felicity of expression find translation painful, and 
some cannot do it at all. 
Translation .always involves compromises which alter 
communication . it is today a deep and open question 
what a perfect translation would be and how nearly an 
actual translation can approach the ideal .^ ^ 
“Post, P.202. 
2。RC, P.267 . 
21 工 bid., P.268. 
23 
Reflection on translation leads Kuhn to draw a connection 
between incoitimensurability and Quine ‘ s indeterminacy of 
translation." Kuhn uses Quine‘s example of “gavagai" to 
illustrate that it is difficult for the linguist to 
decide which translation, "rabbit", “rabbit-kind", 
"rabbit-part“ or "rabbit-occurrence" is the correct 
translation word for "gavagai" . It seems that all the 
translation manuals, according to Quine, are correct 
hypotheses, and they embody a theory." So, the 
translation of “gavagai" is indeterminate. However, in 
this stage, it seems to me that Quine ‘ s thesis claims 
that all translation manuals are correct and they are 
equally good. Kuhn‘s incommensurability thesis, however, 
claims that no exact and correct translation is possible 
because we cannot find a common language through which 
the terms in one language can be expressed in the 
language of another theory.'' 
During this transitional period, Kuhn thinks 
that theories employ different systems of “ontological 
c a t e g o r i e s " I t is because different paradigms use 
“ R C , P.2 68; TCSC, P.191; The relationship between 
incommensurability and indeterminacy of translation is 
discussed in Chapter 3 and 4. 
23 RC, p.268-69. 
The difference between incommensurability and 
indeterminacy of translation is discussed systemically in 
Chapter 3. 
“ R C , P.270. 
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different ontological categories to classify different 
o b j e c t s . After the revolution, the whole set of reference 
is changed. Kuhn describes the situation that 
one aspect of every revolution is, then, 
that some of the similarity relations 
change. Objects which were grouped in the 
same set before are grouped in different 
sets afterwards and vice versa. Think of the 
sun, moon. Mars, and earth before and after 
Copernicus； of free fall, pendular, and 
planetary motion before and after Galileo； 
or of salts, alloys, and a sulphur-iron 
filing mix before and after Dalton. Since 
most objects within even the altered sets 
continue to be grouped together the names of 
the sets are generally preserved 
This categorical change causes the change of the 
reference of different terms. After the scientific 
revolution, although the terms are the same, they are 
classified by different sets and refer to different 
objects. 
So, w e can say that the notion of 
incornmensurabi 1 i ty is limited to the problem of 
translation between different paradigms . Because of the 
absence of the common language, it is not possible to 
translate the terms from one paradigm to another. A l s o , 
because of the change of ontological categories, the 
references of the terms are also changed. 
26 Post,、P.200. 
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2.3 The Later Version 
In the recent development of the concept of 
incommensurability, Kuhn makes a more nuanced account of 
the translation failure and its connection with the 
categorical change. 
Firstly, in an essay "Commensurability, 
Comparability, Coinmunicability", Kuhn responds to many 
critiques and develops his idea about incommensurability. 
He points out that his original idea about 
incommensurability is "local inconamensurability" 
The claim that two theories are 
incommensurable is … t h e claim that there 
is no language, neutral or otherwise, into 
which both theories, conceived as sets of 
sentences, can be translated without residue 
or loss . . . Most of the terms common to the 
two theories function the same way in both； 
their meanings, whatever those may be, are 
preserved； their- translation is simply 
homophonic. Only for a small subgroup of ( 
usually interdefined ) terms and for 
sentences containing them do problems of 
translatability a r i s e , 
“CCC, P.671. 
28 Ibid. , P. 670-71. 
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Incommensurability does not mean that two theories cannot 
be compared because most of their contents and terms can 
function in the same way. However, Kuhn emphasizes that 
his incommensurability thesis means the untranslatability 
between a local subgroup of terms of one theory and 
another local subgroup of terms of another theory. For 
example, in Aristotle's physics, "motion" refers to 
change in general. It includes growth, alterations of 
intensity, and a nuinber of more general qualitative 
changes. The Newtonian understanding of "motion" is only 
the change of position which is only one of the 
subcategories ( subgroups ) of motion for Aristotle. So, 
they use the same word "motion“ to understand the law of 
nature differently. In the case of "motion" in Aristotle 
and Newton, this term is an incommensurable term. 
In the above example, change of the 
classification leads to the failure of translation. In 
two incommensurable theories, certain important 
categories are altered in the transition. Because the 
categories are interrelated ( interdefined ) ' such 
changes are holistic. 
What characterizes revolution is ... change 
in several of the taxonomic categories 
prerequisite to scientific descriptions and 
generalizations. That change, furthermore, 
is an adjustment not only of criteria 
relevant to categorization, but also of the 
way in which given objects and situations 
are distributed among preexisting 
categories. Since such redistribution always 
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involves more than one category and since 
those categories are interdefined, this sort 
of alteration is necessarily holistic. 
Kuhn explains that different theories deploy different 
kinds of "taxonomic structures" . In the process of 
scientific revolution, because of the interrelationship 
of the categories, when one subgroup of categories 
changes its meaning, it is inevitable that the other 
subgroups of categories also change their meanings at the 
same time. Kuhn points out that, in the example of 
Newtonian mechanics, "force" and "mass" cannot be 
understood independently. "Nor can one first learn 'mass‘ 
( o r ‘ force ‘ ) and then use it to define ‘ force ‘ ( or 
•mass I ) with the aid of the Second law"/。 In Newtonian 
understanding, "force", "mass" are integrated into a 
whole theory. If either one of them changes its meaning, 
the other changes at the same time, 
If Kuhn‘s observation is correct, translation 
fails because the meaning of one term is determined by 
other terms in the interdef ined set. He uses a chemical 
term "phlogiston" to illustrate his point. Someone thinks 
that w e can use modern language to translate this 
eighteenth century term. However, the other interdefined 
terms like "principle" and "element“ are untranslatable.'' 
29 p ^巩 p.20. 
3。CCC, P. 677 . 
31 工 bid., P. 676. 
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So, the main reason of the untranslatability of 
different lexical structures is that “different languages 
impose different structures on the world" Different 
languages means that different theories use different 
taxonomic structures to understand, classify and explain 
the world. This taxonomic structure is an integrated 
whole in which different theoretical terms are 
interdefined. If we want to understand the meaning of one 
of them, we have to understand its relation with other 
terms. The translation between different lexicons is 
difficult because different "categories and shared 
relationship between them'"' have to be preserved. 
However, Kuhn thinks that although translation 
is difficult, it is not impossible that different 
theories can have communication with each other and the 
untranslatability does not lead to the impofessibility for 
the historians to understand the past theories. Kuhn 
points out that the historians can use “ interpretation“ 
method to understand the past scientific texts rather 
than the method of "translation" Interpretation 
requires a premise that the foreign language is 
32 工 bid., P.682. 
“工 b i d . , P.683. 
34 CCC, P. 67 6-77. The distinction between 
“interpretation“ and "translation“ is important in a 
sense that Kuhn distincts his incommensurability thesis 
with Quine ‘ s indeterminacy of translation. So, the 
discussion of this distinction is found in Chapter 3. 
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learnable. The interpreter's understanding of the past 
scientific text is a kind of learning process. To learn a 
strange way to classify and explain the world. The main 
implication is that interpretation does not require 
translation.'' So, the modern man can still understand the 
pre-modern understanding of the world. 
To conclude this developmental process, from 
SSR to the recent position, the concept of 
incommensurability plays an important role to understand 
Kuhn‘s philosophy of science. This concept is always 
related to other key notions in the development, for 
examples, paradigms and scientific revolution in SSR, 
translation and concept of language in the transitional 
period and taxonomic structures and interpretation in the 
later stage. Moreover, we can see that this concept is 
defined again and again. From the radical standpoint, 
about the coinmunication-breakdown between different 
paradigms, to a moderate idea such as “ local 
incommensurability", this concept is related to language. 
Actually, during the whole process, the reason 
for the communication difficulty between different 
paradigms is the problem of language. In SSR, different 
scientific coiranunities use different languages to 
describe the world. The meaning of their words is changed 
Kuhn points out that the success of the 
interpretation does not imply success with the 
translation, see CCC, P,673. 
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and they use it in a different w a y . After that, Kuhn 
describes that there is no common language to express the 
full meaning of two rival theories. Therefore, it leads 
to a translation failure. In the recent stage, Kuhn 
asserts that different scientific theories are basically 
different lexicons; they have different classification 
methods to understand the w o r l d . Translation failure 
still exists. However, this failure does not affect our 
understanding of the past and rival theories. The 
learnability of other languages ( theories ) makes the 
comcnunication and understanding possible. So, w e can 
point out that Kuhn ‘ s incoitimensurability thesis is 
developed around the understanding of the relationship 
between langauge, reality and translation. 
31 
Chapter 3 
工 n c o m m e n s u r a b i 1 i ty verus 工 n d e t erminacy 
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3.1 Quine ‘ s Indetermiiiacy of Translation 
The relationship between language and meaning 
is one of the important questions in western philosophy. 
Some think that their relation is fixed. That means every 
word has their meanings which are determined. Based on 
this assumption, they have coimnon viewpoint on 
translation. They think that there is only one 
corresponding relationship between two different 
languages. In language LI, we have a sentence S. This 
corresponding relationship can help us to find out the 
correct translation T in language L 2 .工 n S, we have only 
one correct translation because there is only one 
corresponding relationship between LI and L 2 . In this 
s e c t i o n ,工 want to present Quine ‘ s point of view on 
translation to oppose the above opinion. Quine‘s idea on 
translation is based on his behavourist and naturalist 
theory of meaning. Confronting with the traditional 
concept of meaning, Quine talks about indeterminacy of 
translation. He claims that it is possible to have 
different translation manuals which are equally good； the 
question of right or wrong translation does not exist. 
Quine points out that the above wrong 
conception of meaning and translation is based on the 
idea of ir^th of museum 
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in which the exhibits are meanings and the 
words are labels. To switch languages is to 
change the labels. Now the naturalist‘s 
primary objection to this view is not an 
objection to meanings on account of their 
being mental entities, though that could be 
objection enough. The primary objection 
persists even if we take the labeled 
exhibits not as mental ideas but as Platonic 
ideas or even as the denoted concrete 
objects. Semantics is vitiated by a 
pernicious mentalism as long as we regard a 
man's semantics as somehow determinate to 
overt behavior. It is the very facts about 
meaning, not the entities meant, that must 
be construed in terms of behavior . ^  
This museum rr^th of meaning regards meanings as ( 1 ) 
m e n t a l entities, ( 2 ) Platonic ideas and ( 3 ) the 
denoted concrete objects. In ( 2 ) , meaning is a kind of 
unchanged, universal and determinate entity. However, 
Quine adopts a behavourist theory of meaning in a sense 
that “ language is a social art which w e all acquire on 
the evidence solely of other people's overt behavior 
under publicly recognizable c i r c u m s t a n c e s . L a n g u a g e is, 
according to Quine, not something like a Platonic idea 
w h i c h has the fixed relationship between language and 
meaning, and they exist in an ideal world ‘ However, 
Language is constructed by the intersubjactive relation 
in a social w o r l d . Moreover, Quine points out that 
meaning is and only is understood in terms of behaviour. 
When w e learn to use language, what w e have to study is 
1 OROE, P.27. 
2 工 b i d . , P.26. 
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the other people‘s responses and their interactions. All 
these things are observable. So, to learn and to use 
language is to act and interact with each other. Munitz‘s 
analysis is right that Quine 
stresses the need for a thorough empirical 
study of the behavioral and publicly 
observable responses of individuals under 
particular nonverbal and verbal stimulations 
3 
in the course of learning a language. 
The behavioral view on meaning leads Quine to 
adopting the indeterminacy of meaning. Opposing the 
museum myth which claims that language and meaning has a 
fixed and determinate relationship, Quine also gives up 
seeking the assurance of det erminacy. Moreover, some 
think that the det erminacy of meaning is important in a 
sense that ( 1 ) language is the tool for us to 
understand, describe and explain the world. ( 2 ) The 
meanings of our words or sentences are defined by the 
objects. That means to determine whether the words or 
sentences are meaningful is based on the relationship 
between the words and their denoted objects. ( 3 ) If we 
want to make sense of our language, the premise is that 
the relationship between our language and the world must 
be determined. ( 4 ) So, the linkage between our language 
and the world must be fixed; then the determinate meaning 
of language must be required.工 call the above argument 
3 Munitz Milton K. , Contemporary Analytic Philosophy, 
N.Y.: Macmillan Publishing Co., 1988, P.375. 
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determinate theory of meaning. Quine stresses that, in a 
naturalist point of view, meaning does not exist in an 
abstract and ideal world. So, it is a waste of time to 
seek the so-called determinate language-object 
relationship. The determinate theory of meaning assumes 
that meaning is fixed and exists somewhere. If w e cannot 
find it out, it is hopeless to use our language to 
describe the w o r l d . Quine disagrees with the determinate 
idea of meaning. 
For naturalism the question whether two 
expressions are alike or unlike in meaning 
has no determinate answer, known or unknown 
except insofar as the answer is settled in 
principle by people‘s speech dispositions' 
known or unknown . 
Following the indeterminacy of meaning, Quine talks about 
the indeterminacy of translation. We can treat this 
indeterminacy thesis as an example of the behaviourist 
and naturalist idea of meaning and language. The 
procedure to construct this thesis is presented as 
follows. 
Indeterminacy of translation means that, in 
Quine ‘ s Word and Object, when a linguist wants to 
translate language LI to language L2, he or she uses 
different methods to construct different translation 
manuals which are compatible with the totality of speech 
4 OROE, P.29. 
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dispositions, but all of them are incompatible w i t h one 
a n o t h e r / Quine stresses that it is wrong to regard that 
there is only one translation manual between LI and L2 • 
It is possible to have two or more translation manuals 
w h i c h are compatible with all the observable verbal and 
nonverbal behavior. Moreover, these translation manuals 
are incompatible with each other. 
Quine considers a translation which is not 
proceeded between two or more popular languages, e.g. 
English and French. What he thinks is called “radical 
translation“ which is proceeded between a remote language 
and the linguist ‘ s language. So, two things have to be 
borne in mind that ( 1 ) there is not any translation 
manual which already exists between the linguist and the 
native. That means the translator has not any previous 
knowledge about the remote tribe's language, and ( 2 ) 
what the translator can do is only to observe the tribe‘s 
speech dispositions, and links the language context with 
the sound which he has heard. 
Quine uses “ gavagai ” as an example to 
illustrate his point. When a rabbit passes, the native 
says ： “gavagai“； the linguist notes down “rabbit" as one 
of the possible translation. Thus, the linguist has to 
test which hypotheses is correct. How can he do so ？ The 
method is that, the next time, when the language context 
5 WO, P.27. 
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reappears ( a rabbit passes again ), the linguist says ： 
“gavagai" and observes the native‘s response. N o r m a l l y , 
there are only two choices： assertion or d i s s e r t i o n . 
M o r e o v e r , the linguist has to determine w h i c h w o r d s 
represent "assert“ and “dissert “ respectively. H o w e v e r , 
this w o r k is rather difficult because ( 1 ) it is 
p o s s i b l e that there is no particular w o r d w h i c h 
represents "assert“ or "dissert“ in the native's language 
system; ( 2 ) although the linguist knows “ evet “ and 
"y〇k" represent "yes" and "no", h e still cannot know 
w h i c h is which；® ( 3 ) the native m a y m a k e m i s t a k e s . 
Suppose the linguist can settle the assert-
dissert problem, the next job is to link the native's 
language w i t h the linguist's language, e . g . E n g l i s h . 
B e c a u s e of the large amount of observational data about 
the native‘s speech dispositions, the linguist can 
conclude" that, basically, the stimulus meaning® of the 
n a t i v e ‘ s wo r d and the linguist ‘ s w o r d is the same. 
H o w e v e r , the most important point is h e r e . The linguist 
w i l l discover that this linkage relationship is not 
‘ m , P.29. 
7 This conclusion is followed from the inductive 
m e t h o d , the linguist observes a limited amount of 
native‘s speech behaviours and makes a conclusion of the 
relationship between native's w o r d and linguist's w o r d . 
8 Quine distinguishs affirmative and n e g a t i v e 
stimulus m e a n i n g . The former of a sentence means that, 
for a given speaker, the class of all the stimulation 
w h i c h can prompt assent. The latter is vice v e r s a . See 
WO, P.32-33. 
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fixed. That means the stimulus meaning of both will be 
changed in the future. If so, the stimulus condition 
becomes the criterion through which the linguist can 
match the native's expression with different English 
expressions which are incompatible and the indeterminacy 
of translation is raised. 
One point has to be made clear. The reason why 
the linguist can link the native ‘ s expression and his 
expression is that, apart from the observation and 
through the above queries, the linguist has to make some 
hypotheses in order to match the different languages. 
Quine calls this kind of hypotheses “analytical 
hypotheses". 
He ( the linguist ) segments heard 
utterances into conveniently short recurrent 
parts, and thus compiles a list of native 
•words‘. Various of these he hypothetically 
equates to English words and p h r a s e s , . . . 
9 
Such are his analytical hypotheses,... 
Analytical hypotheses is a kind of tool for the linguist 
to consider which word of his home language can match the 
native's word. However, the relationship which 
established by analytical hypotheses is not always fixed. 
Quine stresses that analytical hypotheses "is a way of 
catapulting oneself into the jungle language by the 




is affected by his home language system when he considers 
the analytical hypotheses. His home language structure 
and language customs are immanent. So, when the linguist 
wants to construct the translation manual, he projects 
his language customs into the analytical hypotheses 
If Quine ‘ s analysis of the formulation of 
translation manuals and analytical hypotheses is correct, 
two implications follow. ( 1 ) It is possible to 
construct two or more rival analytical hypotheses which 
are compatible with all the native's speech dispositions; 
these rival analytical hypotheses are imcompatible with 
each other because they put different meanings into the 
native‘s word. ( 2 ) Furthermore, there is no objective 
criterion for us to evaluate which analytical hypothesis 
is better than the other. They are useful in a sense that 
the native‘s speech dispositions are compatible with 
them. Right or wrong translation is not a matter of fact. 
3.2 The Multiplicity and the Failure of Translation 
11 Quine himself actually uses the word "project" to 
explain analytical hypotheses, see Quine, “On the Reason 
for Indeterminacy of Translation", The Journal of 
Philosophy, 67, 1970, P.179. 
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If m ^ analysis of Quine‘s indeterminacy idea is 
c o r r e c t ,工 want to point out that there is a fundamental 
d i f f e r e n c e between Kuhn‘s incommensurability and Quine‘s 
indeterminacy, though b o t h are talking about the 
difficulty of translation. This difference leads us to 
h a v e a m o r e appropriate idea of incoinmensurability, at 
least in Kuhn‘ s sense. In this s e c t i o n ,工 want to argue 
that it is misleading if w e identify Kuhn ‘ s 
incommensurability w i t h Quine ‘ s indeterminacy and assert 
that w e can treat incommensurability as a kind of Quinean 
n o t i o n of indeterminacy of translation. The p r i m a r y 
difference of both are that Quine‘s indeterminacy thesis 
emphasizes the multiplicity of translation manuals； 
however Kuhn ‘ s idea of incommensurability points out that 
the question is the lack of translation. 
Quine asserts that there can b e many 
translation manuals w h i c h are compatible w i t h all speech 
d i s p o s i t i o n s . When the linguist considers constructing a 
translation ...manual, he faces the p r o b l e m of a m b i g u i t y . 
That m e a n s it is possible for the linguist to translate 
the native's word into different English w o r d s . So, w e 
can imagine that the translation manual consists of 
p a r a l l e l lists of words and p h r a s e s . One is the native's 
v o c a b u l a r y , the other is the translator's home language. 
Each item in the native ‘ s vocabulary is linked w i t h m a n y 
translator's home language w o r d s . This kind of linkage is 
one-many relationship. 
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On the other hand, according to Kuhn, when w e 
talk about the incommensurability between two rival 
scientific theories, w e are talking about the 
untranslatability between them. That means some important 
terms in one scientific theory cannot be fully expressed 
in the other theory. Translation between two different 
scientific paradigms is impossible. So, if a historian 
wants to construct a translation manual in order to 
understand two rival theories, the problem h e faces is 
not the ambiguity of translation because the true 
picture, in Kuhn‘s point of view, is that the historian 
cannot find any words which is possible to be a correct 
translation. 
Incommensurability equals untranslatability, 
but what incommensurability bars is not 
quite the activity of professional 
translators the point at which 工 aim will be 
suggested by the remark that most or all of 
Quine's arguments for the indeterminacy of 
translation can, with equal force' be 
directed to an opposite conclusion： instead 
of there being an infinite number of 
translations compatible with all normal 
dispositions to spsv^ch behavior, there are 
often none at all. 
In the later stage, Kuhn explains why he still uses the 
term “ incoinmensurability" to describe the 
untranslatability between different theories. Although 
12 p駆 s , P. 11. 
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most of the terms in one theory can be translated into 
other theory, some terms may still be untranslatable. The 
reason is that “the. natives structure the animal world 
differently from the way English speakers do, using 
different discriminations in doing so. In this 
situation, Kuhn claims that "gavagai", the example used 
by Quine to illustrate the multiplicity of translation 
manuals, remains an irreducible term. That means this 
term is not translatable into English. Newton-Smith also 
recognizes this difference: "For that relativism ( Kuhn's 
incommensurability ) meant that no translation was 
possible. This relativism ( Quine‘s indeterminacy of 
translation ) gives rise to too many translations. 
3.3 Translation verus Interpretation 
In his analysis, Kuhn focuses on the 
communication and understanding between different 
scientific paradigms. From SSR to his present position, 
Kuhn still draws a negative conclusion about that, though 
his standpoint on incoiranensurability is much modest in 
his recent development. Like Kuhn, Quine is also 
cCC, P. 673 . 
14 Newton-Smith W . , "Relativism and the Possibility of 
工nterpiretation" in Martin Hollis and Steven Lukes ( eds)‘ 
Rationality and Relativism, Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 
1982. P.ilV. 
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struggling with the communication between two remote 
language cortimunities. What he concerns is how the members 
of one linguist community can use their language to 
express the world of the other linguist community. The 
indeterminacy is Quine‘s conclusion. 
However, although both consider the problem of 
communication between two language communities, they 
adopt different methodologies to solve their problems. 
Quine stresses that the way for the linguist to 
understand the native's language is the method of 
translation. On the other hand, in his recent position, 
Kuhn distances himself from Quine that ( 1 ) it is 
misleading when someone says that two remote language 
communities cannot communicate with each other t o t a l l y , ( 
2 ) the method for one linguist community to understand 
the other is interpretation, instead of translation. 
In this part, the distinction between 
translation and interpretation is discussed. This 
distinction also becomes a part of Kuhn ‘ s later 
incommensurability thesis. Kuhn claims that successful 
communication requires successful interpretation, instead 
of translation. This methodological difference provides a 
key point to undsrstani their relationship between the role and the 
work of Quine's radical translator and Kuhn's h i s t o r i a n of 
science, though the communication problem is in both 
minds. Secondly, the method of interpretation used by the 
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historian of science can reserve a limited notion of 
incoinmensurability and solve the problem of 
communication. 
The reason why Kuhn considers the distinction 
between translation and interpretation is that, in his 
early position, Kuhn points out that incommensurability 
means the impossibility of translation between the old 
and the new theories. However, it seems that, in SSR, 
Kuhn does exactly what he refutes in that he uses his 
modern language to translate the language of past 
scientific theories in order to understand them. In 
short, his early works exactly contradicts his claim on 
the notion of incommensurability. 
In order to defend his incoimiensurability 
thesis and to face the above attack, Kuhn claims that the 
job of a historian of science, like he, is to give a 
successful interpretation, rather than a translation/^ If 
the historian's interpretation succeeds, what he plays is 
a role of language learner/' Kuhn's strategies are 
( 1 ) using the concept of interpretation to point out 
that, though different scientific theories are 
incommensurable, communication still exists between them； 
( 2 ) language learning exists in the processs of 
interpretation; this notion of learnability of language 
15 CCC, P.671. 
CCC, P. 673. 
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shows that some terms are unknowable to the historian and 
that is why he has to learn them in a new w a y . In this 
context, Kuhn can still talk about incommensurability. 
So, the question is focused on the distinction 
of translation and interpretation. Kuhn claims that the 
confusion is easy because the latter is often involved in 
the former； however they are two independent processes. 
Kuhn‘s notion of translation is that: 
( T 1 ) translation is done by the person who 
knows two languages . 
( t 2 ) “the language into which the translation 
is cast existed before the translation was b e g u n . 
( t 3 ) “the translated text tells more or less 
the same story, presents more or less the same ideas, or 
describes more or less the same situation as the text of 
w h i c h it is a translation. 
On the other hand, interpretation in Kuhn‘s understanding 
is that: 
( 1 1 ) "the interpreter may initially command 
only a single language. 
( 1 2 ) If the interpreter succeeds, what he has 
done is to learn a new language 
”工bid., P.672. 
18 Ibid. 
工 b i d . 
2。工 b i d . 
21 工 b i d . , P.673 / 
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( 1 3 ) "acquiring a new language is not the 
same as translating from it into one's own. Success with 
the first ( interpretation ) does not imply success with 
the second ( translation ) . 
( 1 4 ) “ (t)hese are the untranslatable terms 
for which the historian or some predecessor has had to 
discover or invert meanings in order to render 
intelligible the texts on which he works. 
Kuhn uses Quine‘s story of radical translation 
to illustrate the above points. The native's language 
( n l ) and the linguist's language ( LL ) are two remote 
languages. Firstly, in ( T2 ) , the nuinber and the realm 
of meaning of LL are fixed. Kuhn's objective in this 
point is that the expressive power of LL cannot be 
expanded. He rejects two ways of expanding the expressive 
power of LL, one is to change • the meaning of words or 
phrases, the other is to increase the size of vocabulary 
of L L . The reason for the rejection of the former is that 
actually it is not the nature of translation if the 
meaning of the words can change in different s i t u a t i o n s . 
The reason for the rejection of the latter is that if the 
linguist introduces the term ”gavagai" into LL, rather 
than finding a term to correspond to it, the result is to 
22 工 bid. 
23 工 b i d . , P.677. 
24 工 b i d . , P.672. 
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alter LL and that is also not the job of translation.^^ 
So, translation is much difficult than interpretation. In 
( 1 1 ) and ( 12 ) , Kuhn points out that when we reject 
the above two ways of expanding the expressive power of 
LL, what the interpreter can do is to describe and to 
learn.^^ To describe is to make a successful description 
of the reference of the term “gavagai" in LL. To learn is 
to recognize some particular features of the term 
“gavagai“ which are unknowable to LL； the linguist has to 
learn how to use it, rather than to translate it. So, 
communication can be achieved because the linguist can, 
in principle, has successful description. On the other 
hand, incommensurabi1i ty still exists because LL may 
supply no descriptive terminology to understand N L . 
Secondly, in ( Tl ) and (工1 ), what the job of 
radical translator in Quine‘s story is actually, in 
Kuhn's understanding, an interpreter.'' Apart from his 
language, the linguist does not know NL before his job 
begins. Moreover, the first job of the interpreter is to 
learn a new language, rather than to translate it. This 
learnability of language - guarantees the possibility of 
conununication between two different linguist communities. 
However, this does not guarantee a successful 






science is an interpreter and a language learner. What 
he has to do is to describe the world in which the past 
scientist believed, instead of translating the term of 
past scientific text into the modern language. 
In sum, Quine understands the linguist as a 
radical translator. When he wants to understand the 
remote language, the method is translation. That means he 
has to find some words in LL which can correspond to the 
native's word in N L . On the other hand, Kuhn thinks that 
translation is not easy to achieve. He understands the 
historian of science as an interpreter, rather than a 
translator. When he wants to understand the past 
scientific language, his method is interpretation. 
Translation is not necessary. Interpretation always 
involves language learning and description. The former 
maintains the incommensurability thesis and the latter 
provides the possibility of communication. 
3.4 Inscrutability and Determination of Reference 
In our common sense, one of the main purposes 
of language is the use of it to describe the w o r l d . The 
references are the objects which the language refers to. 
28 工 bid., P.676-677. 
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Some philosophies claim that the criterion for finding 
the meaning of our terms or expressions is only in the 
corresponding relationship between our terms and the 
references. The term “rabbit" refers to the object, 
rabbit. The reference of the “rabbit" is the actual 
object, rabbit. In our ordinary situation, the speaker 
knows what his language refers to, and the hearer also 
recognizes the reference of the speaker‘s language, 
However, Quine stresses that, in two different 
language communities, the references are not always 
determined. Based on his behavourial idea of meaning, it 
is difficult for one to recognize what the other 
speaker‘s references are. His argument is expressed as 
follows： 
Quine‘s indeterminacy thesis consists of three 
interrelated notions which are indeterminacy of 
translation, inscrutability of reference and 
u n d e r det erminat ion of scientific theory.'' The first one 
is discussed in Chapter 3.1. In this section,工 want to 
focus on the second one, the inscrutability of reference. 
Quine emphasizes that his "gavagai" example is only the 
best example of the inscrutability of reference, not of 
Quine, "Three 工 n d e t e r m i n a c i e s " in Robert B. Barrett 
and Gibson Roger F. ( eds ), Perspectives on Quine, 
Cambridge: Basil Blackwell, 1980'. P.l. 
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the indeterminacy of t r a n s l a t i o n . T h a t means if we want 
to have an appropriate and complete understanding of 
Quine‘s indeterminacy thesis, especially his “gavagai" 
example, we have to go into his discussion about the 
inscrutability of reference. 
The main question in the Quine's “gavagai" 
example is that it is difficult for the linguist to 
translate the native‘s expression “gavagai“ into 
"rabbit", "undetached rabbit parts" or "rabbit stage". 
Why is it so difficult to settle this question ？ When the 
linguist translates “gavagai“ into "rabbit", what he 
assumes is that “gavagai" is a universal term, “gavagai“ 
and “rabbit" refers to the same reference. However, this 
assumption is in question. Quine points out that it is 
also possible for this native‘s expression to refer to 
the undetached parts of rabbit or the rabbit stage. 
(A) whole rabbit is present when and only 
when an undetached part of a rabbit is 
present； also when and only when a temporal 
31 
Stage of a rabbit is present. 
The only difference between rabbits, 
undetached rabbit parts, and rabbit stages 
is in their individuation. If you take the 
total scattered portion of the 
spatiotemporal world that is made up of 
rabbits, and that which is made up of 
undetached rabbit parts, and that which is 
Quine, “ On the Reason for Indeterminacy of 
Translation" in The Journal of Philosophy, 67, 1970, 
P.182 . 
31 OROE, P. 30. 
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made up of rabbit stages, you come out with 
the same scattered portion of the world each 
of the three times. The only difference is 
in how you slice it. And how to slice it is “ 
what ostension or simple conditioning... 
, 3 2 
cannot teach. 
Quine emphasizes that “rabbit", ”undetached 
parts of rabbit" and “ rabbit stages" are three 
interrelated notions. Their difference cannot be sliced 
by ostension. Ostension is a method to correlate the word 
and the object. Its method is that the linguist can point 
to the object, rabbit, and asks the native： "Is it the 
rabbit ？ “ Many children learn new words through this 
ostensive method. When the mother wants to teach her 
child what “dog" means, she simple points to a dog and 
says "dog". The child learns the meaning of the word 
through correlating the sound/word and the object. 
However, Quine stresses that this method does not work in 
the radical translation. The reason is that 
whenever we point to different parts of the 
rabbit, even sometimes screening the rest of 
the rabbit, we are pointing also each time 
to the rabbit. When, conversely, we indicate 
the whole rabbit with a sweeping gesture, we 
are still pointing to a multitude of rabbit 
33 
parts . 
32 Ibid., P.32. Italics is mine. 
工 bid. 
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Quine‘s “gavagai" example illustrates that these three 
parts, rabbit, undetached parts of rabbit and rabbit 
stages, are indivisible. 
The only solution of the above problem is that 
the linguist has to find out the native's language 
equivalents of English "plural endings, pronouns, 
numerals, the ‘ is ‘ of identity, and its adaptations 
•same' and ‘ other ‘ . “ ‘‘ That means the linguist 
can ask the native： "Is this gavagai the same as that one 
？ " or "Is this one gavagai or two ？ " However, Quine 
points out that this final solution also fails. The 
reason is the confusion of "is the same as" and "belongs 
w i t h " . Quine explains that 
if one workable overall system of analytical 
hypotheses provides for translating a given 
native expression into 'is the same as'' 
perhaps another equally workable but 
systemically different system would 
translate that native expression rather into 
something like 'belongs with' . Then when in 
the native language we try to ask , Is this 
gavagai the same as that ？' we could as well 
be asking ,Does this gavagai belong with 
that ？,Insofar, the native's assent is no 
objective evidence for translating .gavagai' 
as ‘rabbit‘ rather than ‘undetached rabbit 
part‘ or ‘rabbit stage‘ 
34 工 bid. 
35 工 bid. 
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So, in the final stage, the native ‘ s attitude, no matter 
of assert or dissert, cannot determine the reference of 
"gavagai". Quine calls this the inscrutability of 
reference. 
On the other hand, it seems to me that Kuhn 
faces a similar question that, in his study of history of 
science, Kuhn points out that different scientific 
theories are incommensurable. If these rival theories are 
incommensurable, do their scientific terms in different 
scientific paradigms refer to the same object ？ If not, 
how can the historian of science can make sure that the 
same terms in rival scientific paradigms refers to the 
same object ？ The uncertainty of the answer of the above 
question will lead to two basic questions of 
incommensurability: ( 1 ) If there are no way to know the 
same terms in different scientific communities refering 
to the same object, how can Kuhn talk about the 
communication between the past and the modern scientific 
theories ？ ( 2 ) If the historian of science claims that 
it is possible to recognize the scientific terms refering 
to the same object, how can Kuhn still talk about the 
incommensurability of different scientific theories ？ If 
w e want to answer the above questions and distinguish the 
standpoint of Kuhn‘s and Quine‘s, we have to focus on the 
Kuhn‘s later version of incommensurability. 
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Before examining Kuhn‘s later version of the 
problem of reference, it is necessary to review some of 
Kuhn‘s early ideas in this question. Although Kuhn does 
not use the term "inscrutability", it seems that, when he 
discusses the problem of incommensurability, he also 
discusses the relationship between the terms and their 
objects. Kuhn‘s interest is the changing of this 
relationship before and after the scientific revolutions. 
Kuhn points out that different members on different 
scientific paradigms employ the same vocabulary 
d i f f e r e n t l y . The difference of the use is not a matter 
of taste or interest. Actually, Kuhn wants to point out a 
more fundamental reason： 
One central aspect of any revolution is' 
then, that some of the similarity relations 
change. Objects that were grouped in the 
same set before are grouped in different 
ones afterward and vice versa. Think of the 
sun, moon. Mars, and earth before and after 
Copernicus； of free fall, pendular, and 
planetary motion before and after Galileo； 
or of salts, alloys, and a sulpuhur-iron 
37 
filing mix before and after Dalton . 
The reason why the scientists, before and after some 
scientific revolutions, encounter the problem of 
communication is that it seems to them that the meaning 
of some scientific terms are altered. In this context, 




view.38 Moreover, in the above quoted passages, Kuhn 
explains the phenomena that the scientists recongize the 
changing of some scientific terms. Actually, it is not 
the changing of the meaning of scientific terms, at least 
. i t is not the fundamental question. After the scientific 
revolutions, Kuhn explains, somethings are changing. What 
change are the structures or the relational frameworks of 
the scientific terms, instead of the changing of meaning 
of some individual scientific terms. Kuhn's idea is that 
before scientific revolution, Tl, T2, T3 and T4 are 
interrelated terms, and they are the subgroups under the 
category CI. After scientific revolution, their 
relationship is altered; for example, T4 no longer 
belongs to CI, it may be the subgroup of another C 2 . 
The implication of the above analysis is that 
different scientific paradigms hold different scientific 
taxonomic categories. Though some scientific terms are in 
common, they belong to different structures and these 
different structures attach to the world d i f f e r e n t l y . 
However, when we go back to our question of reference, 
the above analysis is not- clear enough to express Kuhn's 
standpoint. Actually, Kuhn does not deal with the 
question of the relationship between the scientific terms 
and their references. Moreover, the above discussions do 
38 Ibid. 
This idea is also found in Kuhn‘s later works. So, 
it seems that this idea has in coiranon throughout his 
works See WSR, P.20-21, CCC, P.682-683. 
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not tell us anything about the complex transformation of 
the scientific terms and their references in different 
scientific paradigms. The idea in Kuhn ‘ s early work is 
that some scientific terms are redistributed in different 
categories after scientific revolution； those terms are 
linked w i t h other scientific terms to form a scientific 
structure which is used to , explain, describe and 
understand our world. 
Kuhn encounters the problem of Quine‘s 
inscrutability of reference thesis directly in "Theory-
Change as Structure-Change" In it, Kuhn distinguishes 
himself from Quine that inscrutability of reference is 
not the idea of Kuhn. He 
do (es) not believe that reference in natural 
or in scientific languages is ultimately 
inscrutable, only that it is very difficult 
to discover and that one may never be 
absolutely certain one has succeeded. But 
identifying reference in a foreign language 
is not equivalent to producing a systematic 
translation manual for that language. 
Reference and translation are two problems' 
not one, and the two will not be resolved 
together . . . Comparing theories . . . demands 
only the identification of reference, a 
problem made more difficult, but not in 
principle impossible, by the intrinsic 
, 41 
imperfections of translations • 
4。TCSC, P. 191. 
41 工 b i d . 
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In the above passages, two points are raised： { 1 ) Kuhn 
points out that it is not impossible, though it is 
difficult, to determine the references in two different 
scientific theories. So, unlike Quine, Kuhn disagrees 
that scientific reference, even natural reference, is 
inscrutable. ( 2 ) Kuhn distinguishes two types of 
activities： identifying reference and constructing 
translation manuals. Unlike Kuhn, Quine‘s thesis stresses 
that indeterminacy of translation and inscrutability of 
reference are the same thing in a sense that the linguist 
cannot determine which translation is correct and which 
reference is the term “gavagai" referring to 
simultaneously. However, Kuhn points out that the 
confusion of the two is Quine‘s fault. Although Kuhn does 
not give his detailed account of the distinction between 
reference and translation, it is sure that a certain 
amount of ambiguitiy exists in translation/' Conversely, 
identification of reference is not the same as 
translation, so the ambiguity of translation does not 
lead to inscrutability of reference. 
It is clear that the limitation of Kuhn‘s above 
points of view is the absence of the detailed argument of 
the distinction between identifying reference and 
42 See TCSC, P.191. “Translation always and 
necessarily involves imperfection and compromise； the 
best compromise for one purpose may not be the best for 
another； the able translator must repeatedly shift his 
choice of word and phrase, depending on which aspect of 
the original it seems most important to preserve.“ 
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producing translation manuals. Actually, Kuhn himself 
also recongnizes this difficulty and he spends a lot of 
time discussing i t / ' In the following,工 will focus on 
Kuhn ‘ s idea in his discussion about the problem of 
reference. 
When Kuhn discusses the problem of reference, 
he actually wants to criticize one idea which is 
expressed by Philip K i t c h e r K i t c h e r ' s idea is that, 
according to Kuhn‘s understanding, modern scientific 
language is capable of identifying references of the 
terms of past scientific language. Moreover, Kitcher 
understands this process of reference-determination as 
translation/' Such as, ”dephlogisticated air" sometimes 
refers to oxygen, or refers to oxygen enriched 
atmosphere/^ S〇,he can draw a conclusion that if the 
translatability between different scientific theories is 
43 See WSR, P.20-21; CCC, P.674-676; PWHS, P. 24-32; and 
also Kuhn,"Dubbing and Redubbing： the Vulnerability, of 
Rigid Designation" in C.W. Savage ( ed ), Scientific 
Theories. Minnesota Studies in Philosophy of Science 14, 
Minneapolis： University of Minnesota Press, P.298-318 . In 
PWHS, P.24-32 and "Dubbing and Redubbing", Kuhn mainly 
criticzes Putnam's and Kripke‘s causal theory of 
reference. 
44 CCC, P.674-676. 
Kitcher's idea on identifying reference and 
translation is similar with Quine‘s conception of 
identifying indeterminacy of translation and 
inscrutability of reference. 
“ CCC, P.674. 
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possible, it seems that Kuhn‘s idea of incommensurability 
does not make sense 
Although Kuhn agrees that modern scientific 
language is capable of identifying references of the 
terms of past scientific language, he does not agree that 
this process is a translation process. Firstly, Kuhn has 
a different point of view on translation. Based on our 
discussion in Chapter 3.3, w e can see that translation is 
a rather strict process. Kuhn explains that translation 
must preserve truth-value in appropriate contexts, but it 
also must preserve the intension or sense. The latter one 
is rather difficult. Such as, French words “doux"/"douce" 
can be applied to honey ( “sweet“ ), to wool ( " s o f t " ) , 
to underseasoned soup ( "bland" ) , to a memory 
("tender") .48 when the translator considers the above 
situation, he has to choose some aspects of the intention 
of the French term and gives up the other aspects. Kuhn 
emphasizes that the above difficulty of translation is 
not the difference of context, but the "conceptual 
disparity"'' of two different languages. Moreover, Kuhn 
points out that Kitcher' s problem is that h e restricts 
translation to truth-value preservation or equivalent as 
a criterion of a d e q u a c y . T h a t means, Kuhn points out, 
47 工 b i d . 
48 工 b i d . , P.679. 
工 bid., P. 680. 
5。工 b i d . 
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what KitCher describes is actually a process of 
interpretation, instead of translation. Because the 
criterion of perfect translation, in Kuhn‘s sense, is so 
harsh. Furthermore, what Kitcher misunderstands is that 
scientific terms belong to an interrelated structure. 
There are clusters of these structures. Some words are 
untranslatable, they have to be learned as a whole. 
About the problem of reference, what Kuhn 
really considers is "how can the immediate similarity 
relations relevant to the identification of an empirical 
concept‘s referents and nonreferents be learned by 
ostension In matching the terms and the references, 
the important point is not to find the rule or criterion 
by which we can have our matching. Kuhn believes that 
one may legitimately make use of anything 
one knows or believes about those referents. 
Two people may … s p e a k the same language 
and nevertheless use different criteria in 
52 
picking out the referents of its terms. 
So, in Kuhn‘s understanding, different members in the 
same language community will employ different 
characteristics of their concepts‘ references to identify 
these references and distinguish them from non-
Hoyningen-Huene Paul, Reconstructing Scientific 
Revolutions: Thomas S. Kuhn‘s Philosophy of Science, 
Chicago： The University of Chicago Press, 1993, P. 98. 
52 CCC, P.681. 
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references. Kuhn provides an interesting thought 
experiment: 
A mother first tells her daughter the story 
of Adam and Eve, then shows the child a 
picture of the pair in the Garden of Eden. 
The child looks, ... and says, "Mother, 
tell me which is which.工 would know if they 
,,53 
had their clothes on." 
For the child, his criterion of identifying who is a man 
and who is a woman is their clothing. On the other hand, 
his mother may employs different criterion to identify 
who is Adam and Eve, her criterion may be their sexual 
organs, and otherwise. The above discussion suggests that 
different language coimnunities use different criteria to 
pick out their references for their terms. However, even 
in the same language cornmunity, their mertibers also face 
the same problem. 
Thus, the problem is that: when different 
speakers use different criteria of the same concepts in 
identifying referents, what guarantees the unequivocal 
use of these concepts in the linguistic community ？ Apart 
from their difference in adopting criteria, what are the 
common features they share in order to make sure that 
they always pick out the same referents ？ 
“工 b i d . 
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The important point is not what they share 
commonly'^ . Kuhn emphasizes that "the ability to identify 
correctly the mernbers of one set often requires a 
knowledge of constrast sets as w e l l . T h a t means 
learning a given concept requires an ostension of members 
of neighboring similarity classes. This concept cannot be 
learned in isolation. When a child learns to identify 
geese, Kuhn suggests that, he may also be required to 
learn to identify similar creatures such as ducks and 
s w a n s . That means a child learns to identify geese 
through ostension. This process does not or may not teach 
him the characteristics shared by the actual geese. 
Indeed, this child may learn what the geese is through 
comparing them with the other creatures which have some 
similar characteristics. 
Kuhn suggests that many scientific and natural 
concepts are learned together. This holistic 
charactertistic of language points out that scientific 
and natural terms are linked to one another. An 
individual term cannot exist without the whole. Inside a 
culture or scientific toeory, a foreigner has to learn 
the whole. On the other hand, different speakers do not 
54 Different speakers live in the “ same world", and 
have “common culture". However, these common features are 
not sufficient to answer the question. See CCC, P.682. 
55 CCC, P. 682 . 
工 b i d . , P.682. For detail, see Kuhn, "Second 
Thoughts on Paradigms“, in ET, P.309-316. 
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need to share the same criteria to identify the same 
referents. Actually, the meaning of the concepts and 
their referents determination can be learned. 
3 .5 Summary 
After we have a clearer picture of Quine ‘ s 
indeterminacy thesis and Kuhn‘s later position on 
incommensurability, it is obvious that it is misleading 
when w e use Quine ‘ s notion of indeterminacy of 
translation to explain and understand Kuhn‘s 
incommensurability, though both are talking about the 
communication problem of different linguistic communities 
and the translation problem within these communities. 
In this summary,工 want to suggest that the 
learnability of langauge is the basic difference of Quine 
and Kuhn. Quine stresses that the only way to solve the 
cornmunication problem of two different communities is the 
processs of translation. Translation presupposes that two 
different languages are fixed. That means the work of the 
linguist who wants to translate the native's term is to 
match or link two fixed languages. This process of 
matching or linkage is to find the corresponding 
relationship between two different languages. In Quine‘s 
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understanding, based on his behavourist idea of meaning, 
the ambiguity of translation will exist in the one-many 
linkage relationship. If the linguist ‘ s work is only to 
match the fixed languages, Quine actually ignores the 
flexibility of language. 
Kuhn adopts this characteristic of language 
when he analyses how the historian of science interprets 
the past scientific texts. Because of the learnability of 
language, the historian of science can learn the past 
scientific terms and learn to use the past scientific 
worldviews to understand the past scientist‘s frameworks. 
Communication can exist between different linguistic 
communities without the help of translation. Moreover, 
this learnability of language implies a different 
understanding process, interpretation, for the historian 
of science to communicate with the past scientific terms. 
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Chapter 4 
Incoinmensurability as Indeterminacy 
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4.1 Critique of Traditional Theory of Meaning 
In this section,工 want to present one of the 
coiranon viewpoints of Quine and Kuhn. In their writings, 
although they have their own questions and particular 
problems, translation problem for Quine and 
incommensurability for Kuhn, it seems that they have one 
presupposition about the concept of meaning. For Quine, 
the question of meaning is one of his struggling problems 
in his academic life/ In particular, when he adopts his 
behavourist and naturalist idea of meaning and develops 
his notion of indeterminacy of translation, he actually 
abandons and reflects on a traditional idea of meaning. 
For Kuhn, he also faces the problem of meaning, though 
scientific revolution and incommensurability are his main 
concerns. In SSR, when he talks about the content of 
incommensurability, he talks about the meaning change of 
the scientific terms in rival scientific paradigms. In 
his later position, when he reflects on the difference of 
Quine ‘ s idea and his own idea, he also talks about 
questions of meaning though his standpoint is not the 
same as Quine‘s. Moreover, the following discussion 
points out that Kuhn's idea on the theory of meaning also 
1 In Quine‘s early works, one of his important attacks 
is the critique of empiricism. The main focus is on the 
problem of justification of the notion of synonyiny. See 
Quine, “Two Dogmas of Empiricism" in FLPV, P.20-46. 
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expresses a critical reflection on traditional theory of 
m e a n i n g . 
Before w e discuss Quine‘s and Kuhn's notions of 
m e a n i n g and their reflections on traditional idea of 
m e a n i n g , w e have to point out the reason why they have 
this common sharings on the idea of meaning. That means 
w e have to locate the significance of the notion of 
meaning in their philosophical frameworks.工 want to show 
that the idea of meaning is the focus of Quine ‘ s 
philosophy and Kuhn‘s later philosophy of science. 
For Quine, the problem of meaning is one of his 
m a i n themes in his early philosophical career. His 
rejection on the notion of s y n o n y W / when he attacks the 
distinction of the analytic and synthetic, starts the 
questioning of the traditional empiricist idea of 
m e a n i n g / After that, Quine develops his foundation of 
attacking traditional theory of meaning. This is his 
behavourist and naturalist idea of meaning. Based on 
these two notions, Quine develops his thesis of 
indeterminacy. Moreover, . indeterminacy of translation, 
inscrutability of reference and ontological relativity 
are all grounded on Quine‘s particular idea of m e a n i n g . 
2 工 b i d . , P.20-46 
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When Quine talks about indeterminacy, he 
actually concerns the understanding between two remote 
linguist communities. Their members speak different 
languages. It seems that the only way for them to 
understand one another is to seek the common meaning of 
their vocabularies. Through the seeking of meaning, the 
linguist can in principle translate the remote language. 
However, does the thing "meaning" exist ？ If so, how can 
the linguist find the "meaning" ？ The former question is 
ontological, the latter one is methodological. Quine‘s 
idea of meaning answers these two questions. 
On the other hand, incommensurability produces 
problems of communication and understanding. In SSR, Kuhn 
argues that after the scientific revolution, the meaning 
of scientific, terms changes in different scientific 
paradigms. These scientific terms are understandable only 
within certain scientific paradigms. Outside the certain 
scientific paradigms, these scientific terms are grouped 
and classified into different categories. That means they 
no longer refer to the same references. If so, how can 
the members of different scientific communities 
understand to one another ？ And how do they ( different 
scientific communities ) know what they are talking about 
？ If their terms are only meaningful within their own 
scientific paradigms, it seems that their scientific 
systems are only justified within their own scientific 
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worldviews. Then, how can different members evalute 
different scientific paradigms ？ Is there not any 
objective, paradigm-free criterion for different 
scientific communities to have a better theory-choice ？ 
W e can notice that all these questions are grounded on the 
question of meaning. That means: How can different 
members of rival scientific paradigms know the meaning of 
their scientific vocabularies if they hold 
..："incommensurable". points of view on scientific 
worldviews? 
In his later development, Kuhn has to face the 
above questions and reviews his notion of 
incommensurability. A historian of science, according to 
Kuhn, can understand the meaning of past scientific texts 
through the method of interpretation, though questions of 
incommensurablity still exist. At this point, Kuhn 
distances himself from Quine ‘ s idea on indeterminacy of 
translation. Moreover, Kuhn points out that scientific 
terms are interrelated to one another. They construct a 
holistic framework to understand the world. At this 
point, what Kuhn actually talks about is that the meaning 
of the scientific terms are interdefined. We cannot 
understand some individual terms in isolation. Moreover, 
Kuhn points out that incommensurability still exists but 
in a "local" form.' That means some scientific terms are 
3 CCC, P.670-671. 
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untranslatable. In this case, a historian of science ( or 
other meinbers of different scientific paradigms ) has to 
learn this strange language. This learnability of 
language actually represents a special kind of theory of 
meaning. So, we can see that meaning problem still plays 
a crucial role in Kuhn‘s later scientific thought. 
In the following, we discuss Quine‘s and Kuhn's 
ideas on the critique of traditional theory of meaning. 
M y standpoint is that although they do not hold the same 
ideas on the theory of meaning, a tendency to attack 
traditional theory of meaning exists in both persons‘ 
writings. Moreover, the term "traditional theory of 
meaning" does not refer to a particular philosopher's 
idea or a particular school of theory of meaning. Rather, 
this phrase represents a general idea of the western 
philosophy dealing with the relationship between 
language, meaning and reference. 
Theory of meaning is one of the main concerns 
in many western philosophies. In traditional 
understanding, every word has a meaning and meaning 
exists in the object for which the word stands. The word 
"Dog" has a meaning; this meaning can only be found in 
the relationship between the word “dog" and the object, 
dog. Moreover, this understanding views the function of 
language as something representing the external world. 
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The external world consists of many objects； what w e have 
to do is to use our words ( languages ) to correspond to 
external objects. If our language is meaningful, it is 
only because there are some objects w i t h w h i c h our 
language corresponds. Then, the relationship between 
reference and language is much closer. A hearer can 
understand the speaker‘s words because the hearer can 
find out the reference which corresponds w i t h the words ; 
otherwise the speaker‘s utterance does not m a k e sense. 
Furthermore, if the above description is correct, ‘ this 
w i l l affect the scientific language and logical language. 
This two realms of human knowledge presuppose that there 
is a w o r l d , scientific or mathematical, w h i c h is waiting 
for us to find out. This realistic conception of the 
w o r l d affects the notion of language； the w o r k of the 
scientists or logicians is to find out the “ ideal 
language" with w h i c h they can describe the w o r l d 
correctly. The "ideal language" is ideal in the sense 
that the structure of language corresponds w i t h the 
structure of the external w o r l d . The meaning of the 
language can be obtained because every w o r d corresponds 
w i t h the objects. -
In Quine‘s understanding, the above 
understanding of language and meaning is misleading. 
For the theory of meaning a conspicuous question is the 
nature of its objects： what sort of things are meanings? 
A felt need for meant entities may derive from an 
earlier failure to appreciate that meaning and reference 
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are distinct. Once the theory of meaning is sharply 
separated from the theory of reference, it is a short 
step to recognizing as the primary business of the 
theory of meaning simply the synonymy of linguistic forms 
and the analyticity of statements； meanings themselves, 
as obscure intermediary entities, may well be 
abandoned. ^  
Actually, what is meant by "meaning" ？ Does it exist 
somewhere ？ Meaning is viewed, in traditional 
understanding, as some obscure intermediary entities 
between the words and the reference. However, in Quine•s 
understanding, when we use the word "meaning", there are 
only two ways： "meaning" as "significiant", and the 
question of synonyiiY • ‘ That means we do not lose anything 
if we abandon this concept of "meaning" . So, we can see 
that Quine rejects the idea that meaning exists between 
the words and their corresponding objects, no matter 
these objects are in the external world or mental realm. 
If Quine gives up the traditional understanding 
of meaning, he has to provide a different kind notion of 
meaning. In section 3 . 1 ,工 have already pointed out 
Quine‘s naturalist and behavourist idea of meaning. This 
conception needs detailed discussion here. Quine rejects 
any idealist or realistic ideas of meaning. The former 
asserts that meaning is a kind of mental entity; the 
latter asserts that meaning exists in a real world. He 
4 Quine, “Two Dogmas of Empiricism" in FLPV, P.22. 
5 Ibid., P.12. 
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follows Dewey ‘ s words: meaning is primarily a property of 
behavior.® In Quine‘s words, meanings are 
meanings of language. Language is a social art which we all 
acquire on the evidence solely of other people's overt 
behavior under publicly recognizable circumstances.' 
(T)here are no. meanings, nor likenesses nor distinctions 
of meaning, beyond what are implicit in people's 
.dispositions to overt behavior.® 
Language is a social art. In acquiring it we have to 
depend entirely on intersubjectively available cues as to 
what to say and when. Hence there is no justification for 
collating linguistic meanings, unless in terms of men's 
dispositions to respond overtly to socially observable 
9 
stimulations. 
In the above several passages, Quine asserts that ( 1 ) 
language is a social product. Against the traditional way 
of understanding language as a representational tool, 
Quine stresses the social dimension of language and views 
it as the "essence" of language. ( 2 ) Meaning can only 
be found in an intersubjective relation. In a social 
world, language is treated as a communication tool. Quine 
stresses that meaning is and only is understood in terms 
of overt behavior. Against the traditional theory of 
meaning, Quine ‘ s work is a job of d e w t h o l o g i c a l 
6 OROE, P.27. 
7 工 b i d . , P.26. 
8 工 b i d . , P.29. 
9 WO, P.ix. 
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u n d e r s t a n d i n g of m e a n i n g . Meaning is no longer a ir^stical 
entity w h i c h exists beyond our visible w o r l d or exists 
inside our mental realm. Rather, in the social verbal or 
n o n v e r b a l behavior, speaker and hearer establish an 
intersubjective w o r l d . Through the observation of others‘ 
responses and their interactions, w e can use our language 
and u n d e r s t a n d others‘ language correctly. 
If w e use Quine ‘ s idea of m e a n i n g to examine 
the traditional theory of meaning, w e have several 
conclusions： ( 1 ) the representational function of 
language is misleading； at least it is not the w h o l e 
p i c t u r e . Language is formed in a social w o r l d . Its 
function is m u l t i c i p l i t y . ( 2 ) Meaning does not exist in 
the relationship between the words and the objects for 
w h i c h they stand. W e do not need the notion of m e a n i n g 
and w e can still use our language to describe the w o r l d 
and communicate w i t h each other. ( 3 ) The traditional 
theory of meaning entails that there is only one 
corresponding relationship between language and the 
w o r l d , so it will entail that there is only one correct 
translational manual for the linguist to construct. 
However, Quine rejects this and points out that m e a n i n g 
itself is indeterminated. This standpoint entails his 
indeterminacy of translation. 
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On the other hand, in Kuhn's later development, 
Quine‘s conception of meaning is one of his concern." 
Although Kuhn‘s viewpoints is different from Quine‘s 
ideas, they share some common grounds.” In an essay 
“Possible Worlds in History of Science", Kuhn points out 
his idea of meaning. 
(K) nowing what a word means is knowing how to use it for 
communication with other members of the language 
community within which it is current. But that ability 
does not imply that one knows something that attaches to 
the word by itself, its meaning or its semantic markers. 
Words do not have meanings individually but only through 
their associations with other words within a semantic 
field." 
Two important points arise： ( 1 ) meaning—in—use is 
Kuhn ‘ s idea on meaning. That means to learn a word or to 
understand a word is to recognize its usage and to apply 
this word in a community. ( 2 ) Kuhn points out his 
holistic idea of meaning. Word cannot be understood in 
isolation from other words. Kuhn stresses that this 
holistic character of language can be understood as a 
1。PWHS, P. 11-12; CCC, P. 671, P. 679-683. 
11 In the problem of meaning, Quine gives, up the 
traditional theory of meaning, and it entails that 
universal translatability must be abandoned too. Kuhn 
rejects this point of view. Kuhn stresses that language 
is not a close system. It can be understood by different 
speakers and it can be learned by the members of 
different linguistic communities. That means Kuhn's 
standpoint is that communication can still be obtained 
without the process of translation. For detail, see 
section 3.3 and PWHS, P.11. 
“PWHS, P.12. 
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“lexical network". Different linguistic communities use 
their lexicons to understand the world. 
In order to understand Kuhn‘s idea of meaning, 
w e cannot isolate it from the problem of 
incommensurability. In his later development, Kuhn has to 
deal with the problem of understanding between different 
scientific communities and the maintenance of the concept 
of incoiranensurability. The historian^ of science, 
according to Kuhn, can learn the past scientific texts if 
they cannot translate the words into the modern 
scientific languages. This learnability of language 
implies that meaning is not fixed in a sense that 
historians of science can discover or invert meaning in 
order to render intelligible the past scientific texts on 
which they work/' To deal with the problem of 
communication and understanding between past scientific 
lexicons and modern scientific lexions, the job of 
historians of science is to understanding the "meaning" 
of the scientific concepts. What they have to remember is 
that 
(t)o know the meaning of a concept, that is, to know how 
to use the concept correctly, thus means to know the 
structure of that portion of the lexion in which the 
concepts occur, and to know it by means of criteria, 
”CCC, p.677. 
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particular to the individual speaker, for identifying 
referents and nonreferents of the concept . ^^ 
Although Kuhn does not mention that his ideas 
on meaning exist to attack the traditional scientific 
conception of meaning, we can notice that there is a 
"revolutionary" shift in Kuhn‘s position. Firstly, 
meaning of a concept is no longer a corresponding 
relation between the concept and the external objects, 
such as some theoretical terms, mass, force, etc. We 
cannot observe mass and force which correspond with the 
concepts. However, it does not mean that these words are 
not meaningful. In Kuhn‘s understanding, these words are 
only understood in a broader context. We can know their 
meanings within their scientific theories. In the example 
of Newtonian mechanics, "force" and "mass" must be 
acquired together in the Second Law/' That means, Kuhn 
asserts that, the meanings of "force" and "mass" are 
interdefined： they constitute a web of scientific 
language in which the meaning of other scientific terms 
can be obtained. So, the corresponding picture of 
language and reality is abandoned by Kuhn‘s holistic idea 
of meaning. Secondly, meaning is no longer a mystical 
intermediate entity between the concept and the reality. 
“ Hoyningen-Huene Paul, Reconstructing- Scientific 
Revolutions: Thomas S. Kuhn‘s Philosophy of Science, 
tr. by Alexander T. Levine, Chicago： The University of 
Chicago Press, 1993, P.111. 
IS CCC, P. 677; For detail, see PWHS, P.14-21. 
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It can be learned and can be obtained in use. When we use 
the words to identify the references and nonreferences, 
we actually know how to apply them in different 
scientific contexts. In Kuhn‘s undestanding, because of 
the untranslatability of some terms, we have to learn and 
reuse these terms inside their scientific contexts. If we 
use Wittgenstein's word, scientific language is a kind of 
"language—game" .16 Scientific language is not a kind of 
language for us to find out in order to provide an 
appropriate corresponding structure. Through this 
structure, in traditional understanding, we can 
understand the reality correctly. Conversely, before we 
use our scientific terms, what we have to do is not to 
check their corresponding structures, we just use them to 
signify and name different objects. In a context, 
different members know how to use their scientific terms. 
They can use them not because of the understanding of the 
corresponding relationship. Rather, because they are in 
the same context 
16 Notion of language-game is a concept for later 
Wittgenstein to attack his early philosophy of language. 
In later Wittgenstein's understanding, function of 
language is multiciplity, like games. When we enter the 
context of a game, we will know how to play. Similar to 
this, language is not something fixed. If we want to 
understand the words, we have to enter its context. For 
detail, see Wittgenstein L., Philosophical Investigation, 
tr. by G.E.M.Anscombe, Oxford： Basil Blackwell Ltd., 
1953, section 3-27. 
17 My intention is not to identify Wittgenstein's notion 
of language-game and Kuhn ‘ s idea of meaning, though they 
have some similarities.工 just use Wittgenstein's 
notion as an illustration to understand Kuhn‘s idea. 
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We can conclude that traditional understanding 
of meaning has been attacked by Quine‘s behaviorist and 
naturalist idea of meaning and Kuhn‘s later ideas of 
language and meaning. Both assert that the traditional 
theory of meaning is oversimplified and it limits the 
function of language as a representational tool to have a 
corresponding structure to understanding the world. 
Meaning is not something fixed, or exist between the 
language and the reality. Rather, meaning is and only is 
understood in terms of behavior ( Quine‘s position )； and 
meaning can be learned and understood when using the 
language in a context ( Kuhn‘s position ). 
4.2 Rejection of Neutral and Objective Criterion 
In this section,工 will present other common 
sharing between Quine•s and Kuhn,s. In Quine,s 
indeterminacy of translation thesis, he points out that 
there is not any neutral criterion for the linguist to 
evaluate different translation manuals. They are equally 
good. In Kuhn's later ideas, historians of science do not 
need any objective and neutral criteria in order to 
compare the past scientific texts and the modern 
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scientific texts. Moreover, scientific revolutions, in 
Kuhn‘s understanding, entails at once a whole set of 
changes of interdefined scientific terms. In this 
understanding, a theory replaces another theory in a 
holistic sense. S o ,工 will point out that Kuhn's above 
point of view entails the rejection of neutral criteria 
in the theory choice. 
Neutral and objective standards are important 
in a sense that some think that the reason for our 
scientific progress is that we can establish many 
sophisticated standards to evaluate different scientific 
theories. Moreover, the reason for the replacement 
between different scientific theories is that the better 
theory satisfies the standards and the other cannot. 
However, in constructing translation manuals, 
Quine stresses that there is not any objective criteria 
for the linguist to evaluate which translation manuals 
are better. They are equally good in a sense that they 
are "all compatible with the totality of speech 
dispositions, yet incompatible with one a n o t h e r . B a s e d 
on the behaviorist and naturalist idea of meaning, the 
only way for Quine‘s linguist to translate native's 
language is to observe their behavior and their reaction. 
Also, the linguist has to project his home language 
“ m , p.27. 
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system to construct the analytical hypotheses. So, 
different linguists may construct different translation 
manuals, and they are all compatible with all native's 
speech dispositions. Many translation manuals can be 
useful to understand the native's speech. ^ 
Seeking the neutral and objective standards to 
evaluate different translation manuals in order to choose 
the right one is a failure in the sense that, in Quine ‘ s 
understanding, ( 1 ) they assume that there is one and 
only one correct translation manual which is the only 
corresponding relationship between linguist‘s language 
and native's language. This one-one linkage is rejected 
and replaced by Quine‘s one-many linkage. Moreover, this 
only-one-corresponding-relationship thesis assumes that 
there is one "ideal" meaning in the "ideal" world, and 
these two different language systems can be linked to 
each other because they can find out the "ideal" meaning. 
However, this "ideal" meaning is rejected by Quine. ( see 
Section 4.1 ) ( 2 ) to have a list of neutral and 
objective criteria assume that someone has a 
"transcendental" postion in which they can judge which 
translation manuals are correct. “Transcendental" 
position means that someone is independent of other 
conceptual frameworks. In Quine‘s understanding, no one 
can have this " transcental" position because when y o u 
want to understand a remote language, what we can only do 
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is to use our home language or background language and 
observe speech dispositions. That means it is not 
possible for us to construct translation manuals 
objectively. Furthermore, in Quine_s understanding, 
meaning is in terms of observational action and behavior. 
So, it is impossible for anyone to claim that w e can know 
the meaning of language in an abstract w a y . The only 
standard ( if any ) of meaning criteria is our human 
behavior. To understand human behavior and their 
interactions takes place always in a context. In this 
sense, neutral and objective criteria do not make sense. 
Also, in Kuhn‘s understanding, the picture of 
neutral and objective criteria is rather complex. In an 
early paper, "Objectivity, Value Judgment, and Theory 
Choice", he points out that scientists hold different 
"values" to evaluate the rival theories. Those "values" 
m a y contradict to one another. In that sense, the 
traditional conception of objective analysis, w h i c h 
stresses the importance and possibility of the neutrality 
of scientific standards, is attacked." Furthermore, 
although Kuhn attacks . the objectivity of traditional 
understanding of scientific criteria, he does not mean 
that theory choice is only a matter of scientists ‘ 
different tastes or irrational decision-makings. The main 
19 Kuhn, "Objectivity, Value Judgment, and Theory 
Choice" in ET, P.320-325.工 have discussed this paper in 
Section 2.1. 
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point Kuhn wants to make is that it is misleading that we 
have a list of scientific criteria with which different 
scientific communities can choose the best theory. This 
so-called objective and neutral criteria, Kuhn 
understands, do not exist and are unnecessary in 
scientific progress. 
In his later paper, "What are Scientific 
Revolutions ？ K u h n examines three classical examples, 
from an Aristotelian to a Newtonian understanding of 
motion, from the contract to the chemical theory of the 
Voltatic cell and from Planck's to the now familiar 
derivation of the law of black-body radiation. In these 
scientific revolutions, Kuhn stresses that the reason why 
they are called "revolutions“ is not only that the latter 
provides other laws of nature or has other understandings 
of the natural laws. Rather, changes in criteria also 
happen/。 In Kuhn's understanding, these criteria are not 
only for evaluating the rival theories. The main concern 
of Kuhn is the referential change of some scientific 
terms." That means, during the scientific revolutions, 
the references of some scientific terms are no longer the 
same. These scientific terms refer to other objects. So, 
in his conclusive part, Kuhn stresses that different 
scientific theories entail different taxonomic categories 
20 wSR, P.8. 
工 bid. 
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w h i c h have different distributions, categorizations and 
divisions. Scientific revolutions in this sense are the 
replacement of different taxonomic categories. Moreover, 
those terms in a taxonomic category are interelated. So, 
the change of the taxonomic category involves the change 
of the whole set of interdef ined terms. This is Kuhn ‘ s 
“holistic" idea of scientific theory." 
The references of some scientific terms are 
changed in scientific revolutions. In spite of this 
change, scientist can always pick out the same reference. 
Kuhn points out that we do not need any criteria to 
guarantee the sameness of the references. Actually, two 
people may employ different criteria to pick out the same 
reference though they are in the same language 
community." 
In sum, both Quine and Kuhn reject the seeking 
of neutral and objective criteria. In Quine‘s part, this 
rejection leads to the multiplicity of translation 
manuals; in Kuhn‘s part, this rejection leads to the 
notion of incommensurability. 
“工 b i d . , P.20-21. 
“ C C C , P.681.工 have discussed it in Section 3.4 
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Chapter 5 
Concluding Reflection： Relativism as Understood 
by Kuhn in his later thought 
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Incoiranensurability and relativism are closely 
related. When Kuhn introduces this notion to discuss the 
question of paradigm-shift in SSR, this gives the 
impression that he commits to the position of relativism. 
Actually, this impression has its ground. In SSR, Kuhn 
stresses that incommensurability means that different 
theories hold different and rival world views： they have 
their own conceptual framework to conceptualize the 
external world. Incoiranensurability thesis concerns the 
total difference of these rival conceptual frameworks. 
Relativism, in general, is regarded as the idea that all 
the evaluation standards and conceptual meanings are 
relative to different theories, traditions or paradigms. 
So, we can say that Kuhn‘ s early idea of 
incommensurability is a powerful illustration of 
relativism. At least, Kuhn provides historical evidences 
in western science to support his understanding of 
incommensurability. 
Relativism stresses that different theories 
hold different frameworks for understand the world. They 
have their own ontological structures in which their 
concepts are interrelated to one another in order to 
establish an integrated whole. Moreover, relativists 
claim that different members in different traditions are 
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"locked" in their frameworks. That means their 
frameworks, paradigms or traditions are the "prisons". We 
cannot escape from t h e m / The most serious point is that 
if relativism is right, communication and understanding 
between different traditions are in question. We cannot 
break our frameworks to enter other frameworks in order 
to understand them. 
The above impossibility of communication 
between different theories is understood as the problem 
of translation. In the transitional period, Kuhn points 
out incommensurability means that we cannot translate 
some important terms from one theory to another. It is 
impossible for us to find the coimmon/neutral language to 
express the meanings of some terms of different theories. 
That means communication problem between rival theories 
exists. Furthermore, Quine agrees that translation 
problem exists in radical translation, though his version 
is not exactly the same as Kuhn ‘ s ( Chapter 3 ) . The 
difficulty of translation between the linguist's language 
and the native's language also leads Quine to commit to 
the charge of relativism.' So, Quine and Kuhn agree that 
1 Karl Popper understood relativism in this w a y . See 
popper, "The Myth of the Framework" in M.A.Notturno 
( e d ) , The Myth of the Framework, London & N.Y.: 
Routledge! 1994, P.61. 
2 See Ian Hacking, "Language, Truth and Reason", 
Hollis M . & Lukes S. ( eds ), Rationality and Relativism, 
Oxford: 
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translation problem is the focus in their theories. 
Although relativism has many forms and 
versions,‘ we can focus on several main points： 
( 1 ) Relativist gives up the Platonic and foundational 
idea of meaning, That means meaning is not something 
universal or fixed. It does not exist in an ideal 
world for us to discover. Conversely, meaning of the 
terms is only understood within certain traditions, 
paradigms or frameworks. 
( 2 ) No one is " theory-free" . Our observations and 
explanations are determined by our conceptual 
frameworks. Neutral and objective evaluation cannot 
find their places. Everyone is bound in their 
traditions and paradigms. 
( 3 ) Untranslatability between different traditions or 
paradigms cannot be solved. The meanings of some 
terms are changed in rival frameworks because 
different frameworks have different understandings 
of the world. They employ the terms differently. 
Understanding and communication are the problems 
which cannot be solved through translation method. 
Blackwell, 1982, P.58-61; and Newton-Smith W:, 
"Relativism and the Possibility of Interpretation", in 
Hollis M . Sc Lukes S. ( eds ), op. cit. , P.116-120. 
3 See "Introduction" in Hollis M . Sc Lukes S. (eds), 
Rationality and Relativism, Oxford: Blackwell, 1982,. 
p 5_ii Relativism can be divided into moral relativism, 
conceptual relativism, perceptual relativism, relativism 
of truth and relativism of reason. 
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Based on the above three points, it is understandable 
that some call it a "myth" / and others regard it as the 
eneit^ of scientific rationality. Does relativism einbody 
the truth ？ If w e accept relativism, are w e 
“irrationalists“ ？ 
In the f o l l o w i n g ,工 try to use Kuhn ‘ s later 
idea to evaluate relativism. My point is that relativism, 
in Kuhn‘s philosophical consideration, is right in the 
sense that different theories have their own conceptual 
frameworks, and translational problem exists in rival 
theories. However, relativism does not provide the whole 
picture. In other words, relativism ignores the 
possibility of communication capacity of different 
theories and limits the method of cornmunication in 
translation. Actually, Different members of different 
traditions can communicate through language learning. Our 
language is not fixed in the sense that it can be learned 
and used in different linguist's communities. 
In his later understanding, Kuhn stresses that 
incoiranensurability only exists in a local f o r m / On the 
other hand, incommensurability is still the communication 
4 Karl Popper, op.cit., P.34-35. This myth is stated 
as "a rational and fruitful discussion is impossible 
unless the participants share a corranon framework of basic 
assumptions 〇r, at least, unless they have . agreed on 
such a framework for the purpose of the discussion.” 
‘CCC , P.670. 
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problem between different theories, but in a limited 
area. The reason for Kuhn still holding this conception 
is that scientific theory is an integrated w h o l e . 
Scientific terms are interrelated to each o t h e r / We 
cannot isolate some terms in their interdefined 
relationship. So, Kuhn stresses that this is why 
Newtonian "force" and "mass" cannot be translated into 
Aristotelian or Einsteinian frameworks / This 
interrelated web of scientific terms consititutes a 
holistic understanding of scientific theories. Newtonian 
understanding has its own framework to employ scientific 
terms; Einsteinian understanding also has its own 
interpretation models to use. So, if relativism is 
understood as the idea that different theories hold 
different world views and employ their terms differently, 
Kuhn may accept this version of relativism. 
However, we have to keep in mind that Kuhn 
stresses local incommensurability. The notion of "local" 
is to emphasize the limited area of incommensurability. 
Incommensurability in its local form means that only a 
small group of interdefined terms is untranslatable.' In 
other w o r d s , translation failure does not lead to the 
breakdown of coinmunication of different theories. In the 
6 工 b i d . , P . 6 7 7 . 
7 工 b i d . 
8 工 b i d . , P . 6 7 0 . 
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understanding of the past scientific texts, historians of 
science use the method of interpretation to understand 
the other scientific rameworks. ‘ This interpretation 
method is that the historian of science has to learn the 
untranslatable terms. When he learns those terms, what he 
has to do is to understand the context of the terms and 
know how the terms are used in the past scientific 
theories. So, Kuhn emphasizes the notion of meaning-in-
use in language l e a r n i n g . In sum, communication exists 
between different scientific theories. Language learning. 
according to Kuhn' is the b r i d g e _ t o l i n k _ d i f f e r e n t 
frameworks. 
If Kuhn‘s notion of language learning is useful 
to deal with the communication problem of different 
theories, relativism is partly wrong. W h a t _ r e l a t i v i s m 
ianores i^ that it narrows the function and learnability 
nf lanauacre. Language and framework, in relativists' 
understanding, are closed systems and fixed in their 
structures. Changes of language and framework is 
impossible. However, the meaning of our terms is 
understood in their context. If we can enter different 
scientific contexts, the meaning of scientific terms 
thereof is not difficult to catch. To enter different 
contexts, translation is not the only way because 
^ 工 b i d . , P . 6 7 2 - 6 7 3 . 
1。 P W H S , P.11-12. 
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translation success assumes or presupposes two or more 
corresponding languages, it is too harsh. Language 
learning is the other useful way for us to adopt in 
communication with other theories. 
In conclusion, language and framework 
differences are not the excuses for us to stop 
communication with other traditions. Conversely, language 
learning provides us the way of communication and 
understanding. In Kuhn‘s understanding, 
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